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common knowledge and it is entirely possible that some juries being
aware, from their own knowledge, of the non-taxable feature of verdicts
may consider this aspect while others will not. Also, it may be questioned
whether the non-taxable feature is so complex that the jury cannot handle
it or will be diverted from the main issues of the trial. Is it any more
complex, for example, than the reduction to present worth of a verdict for
loss of future earnings which is often involved in personal injury suits?
Or, is it any more complex than many of the accounting problems that
juries are from time to time called upon to consider in arriving at their
verdicts?
Kelley v. Smith & Oby Co.3 involved generally the problem of proof
of the extent of injury and therefore the amount of damages allowable in a
personal injury action. The rule has been established with reasonable
firmness in Ohio that in a personal injury action the plaintiff must accede
to the defendant's request for reasonable physical examination but that the
plaintiff's counsel and physician may be present during such examination.
In the present case defendant requested that a specified doctor be allowed to
conduct a psychiatric and neurologic examination. The named doctor
stated to the court, by affidavit, that because of the nature of this examina-
tion it could not properly be conducted in the presence of third persons.
On the basis of this, defendant asked that the usually present representa-
tives of the plaintiff be excluded. The court granted the request as to the
psychiatric aspects of the examination but denied it as to the neurologic
aspects saying that the latter did not differ from a general physical examina-
tion. "The nervous and muscular reactions elicited in a neurologic ex-
amination" are not "subject to the will of the patient nor to the presence




The doctrine of "divisible divorce," anomalous though it may first
appear, has become a recognized concept. It is clear that if a. husband
procures an ex parte divorce the decree is effective to dissolve the marriage
relation and is entitled to full faith and credit in all states.' However,
'128 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App. 1955).
'Id. at 167.
3 129 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio Com. P1. 1954).
'Id. at 109.
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the part of the decree which affects personal rights of the wife, though it
may be recognized in other states as a matter of comity, is not entitled to
full faith and credit. Prior to the decisions establishing the "divisible di-
vorce" doctrine there were cases holding that in such a situation the decree
of the state of the matrimonial domicile was entitled to interstate recog-
nition in all respects. In Armstrong v. A mstrong2 the matrimonial domi-
cile was Florida. The husband obtained an ex parte Florida divorce decree
denying the wife alimony. Later both parties moved to Ohio where the
wife sued the husband for a divorce and for alimony. The Ohio Supreme
Court held that Ohio could not grant a divorce but could grant alimony.
The decision points out that alimony is a personal right of the wife and that
the state of the matrimonial domicile is no more interested in the duty of
continuing support than Ohio is. The decision appears to be correct on its
facts, as the wife left Florida for at least six months prior to the Florida
decree. As a broad principle of law, the case seems to be contrary to
accepted rules of conflict of laws. In any event, the United States Supreme
Court, which has the last word on full faith and credit is yet to be heard
from.
As pointed out above, in an ex parte divorce, the part of the decree
which affects alimony and custody need not be enforced in other states.
However, as a matter of policy most states do attempt to determine these
issues in such a case, apparently in the hope that other states will enforce
the decree as a matter of comity, and also because it is desirable to fix the
rights of the parties in advance in case the absent defendant should return.
The lower courts in Ohio have generally followed this practice. The Ohio
Supreme Court held this to be error, at least in the child custody situation
where both the child and the mother are outside Ohio.3
Divorce and Support
There was only one important case on the substantive law of divorce.
The normal rule is that a valid marriage is a prerequisite to a divorce.
Since bigamy is a ground for divorce in Ohio, the court of appeals held that
-the plaintiff in a divorce action based on other grounds does not have to
allege or prove that a prior marriage was dissolved in order to obtain a di-
l The term ex parte is used to refer to a divorce proceeding in which one party is
served with constructive process and fails to enter a general appearance. Of course,
the plaintiff seeking the divorce must be domiciled in the state granting the divorce,
and the constructive service must meet the requirements of due process. Otherwise,
no part of the decree is entitled to full faith and credit.
162 Ohio St. 406, 123 N.E.2d 267 (1954).
8 Swope v. Swope, 163 Ohio St. 59, 125 N.E.2d 336 (1955).
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vorce.4 Presumably, the plaintiff still has to prove a marriage before he
can get a divorce, even though he proves a void or voidable marriage.
The problem of retroactive modification of accrued alimony o;r support
payments has continued to plague the lower courts. Last year the Roach
case, a common pleas decision, indicated that unpaid accruals could be
modified. The case was commented on and criticized in last year's survey
article.5 This year another common pleas court held that accruals were
not as a rule open to modification.6 However, in exceptional circum-
stances, an equity court could retroactively modify the unpaid installments.
The court then proceeded to wipe out installments for the support of a
child which accrued after he reached majority.
Confusion continues to exist in the lower courts on the relation between
a separation agreement and a divorce decree. In two cases the court of
appeals held that an agreement was binding on the parties until judicially
determined on allegation and proof to be invalid by reason of fraud or
mistake.7 In one of the cases, the court held that the agreement which
expressly released the husband from support pending a divorce action was
enforceable, even though the wife incurred extraordinary medical expense
due to illness which arose after the agreement was executed but prior to the
divorce decree. In a third case, another court of appeals held that a
support agreement could cut off the wife's right to support pending a
divorce, but could not cut off the right to expense money in connection
with the divorce.8 In each one of these three cases, the trial court had
disregarded the agreement and awarded alimony. It is to be hoped that the
Supreme Court will eventually clarify this area.
Children
In recent years there has been a substantial body of litigation in other
states on the issue of whether or not the natural parenes consent to adop-
tion is revocable prior to the adoption decree. The problem is an acute
one because of the current almost universal practice of welfare agencies to
take custody of an illegitimate child, to secure an advance consent, and
then place the child in the -home of the adoptive parents for a trial period
of six months or a year before the actual adoption. After some confusion
in the courts, the issue was settled in Ohio by the statute which provides
'Treadway v. Treadway, 125 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio App. 1955).
'6 WnsT. RIts. L REv. 249 (1955).
'Wolff v. Wolff, 124 N.E.2d 485 (Ohio Com. P1. 1954).
'Lowman v. Lowman, 129 N.E.2d 213 (Ohio App. 1955). Nelis v. Nellis, 129
N..2d 217 (Ohio App. 1955).
'Sindair v. Sinclair, 129 N.E.2d 311 (Ohio App. 1954).
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